Kiichi Murashima, chief economist of Nikko Citigroup in Tokyo, has just returned from London. He did not have much fun. After several meetings with investors in both Japanese government bonds and equities, he concluded: “People are losing interest in Japan.”
Lack of enthusiasm stems partly from the fact that Japan's less-than-exciting growth remains dependent on now-more-uncertain external demand. But underlying the disappointment is a deeper concern that political paralysis resulting from last month's collapse of Shinzo Abe's administration will lead to policy seizure.
Superficially, such fears are understandable. Last month Yasuo Fukuda, a 71-year-old man in a grey suit, was hustled into office by a few faction bosses of the ruling Liberal Democratic party. The selection smacked of old-style Japan before Junichiro Koizumi, the last-but-one prime minister, subverted convention by appealing directly to public support
Worse for the worriers, Mr Fukuda, a consensus-style politician, assumes office at a time of apparent backlash against “Koizumi reforms”. In July the ruling party was punished in upper house elections by voters in poorer parts of Japan, for whom five years of recovery has had little tangible effect.
Mr Koizumi, prime minister from April 2001 to September 2006, convinced the electorate – and not a few foreign investors – that there could be “no growth without reform”. Since his period in office coincided with the longest recovery in years, people concluded it must have been the reform that did the trick. The corollary of this simplistic analysis is that if reforms stop now, so will growth.
There is a misunderstanding about the nature of structural reform and what role, if any, it played in Japan's recovery. At the best of times, “reform” is a sloppy word used to mean “good change”, a convenient sanctuary for politicians unwilling to concede that not every new law they instigate is beneficial. In Japan, where it has been conflated to mean both fiscal consolidation and deregulation, the term is less illuminating still.
What role did either cutting budgets or pushing deregulation under Mr Koizumi have in boosting growth? Almost none. When he took over during a banking crisis in 2001, he promised to slash government borrowing. Fortunately, he did no such thing. To have done so would have risked tipping the deflation-riddled economy into even deeper recession. He did cut public works budgets. Towards the end of his tenure, he brought overall spending under control and raised revenue through stealth taxes.
This may have been good for the long-term health of Japan. But few economists, if any, have argued that it spurred recovery.
Deregulation can accelerate growth. But most Japanese deregulation – for example in the financial and retail sectors – was instigated before Mr Koizumi arrived on the scene.
When Mr Fukuda, who was Mr Koizumi's chief cabinet secretary, was asked about that administration's shining deregulatory success, he mentioned a change allowing the sale of cold medicines by non-pharmacists. Convenient as this far-reaching measure was for legions of handkerchief-clutching salarymen, few would claim it was a principal source of growth.
The real key to recovery under Mr Koizumi was the beneficial effect of a booming China on exporters and success in getting banks in shape. Exports were helped further by massive currency intervention to keep the yen low. Even in Japan's muddled debate, that policy was never classified as reform.
The biggest genuine Koizumi reform was postal privatisation. This did not start until a year after he left office and will not be completed until 2017. Yet foreign investors seized on postal privatisation in late 2005 as a reason to snap up Japanese equities, precipitating a near-40 per cent stock market rally.
Lehman Brothers writes in a recent note: “The excitement and rhetorical flourishes of the Koizumi era notwithstanding, the pace of structural reform did not particularly accelerate.” Since Mr Koizumi did not usher in a brave new world, concerns that Mr Fukuda may dismantle all the good work are misplaced.
On the fiscal side, for better or worse the new prime minister appears wedded to deficit-reduction efforts. There may be political pressure to redirect money to hard-pressed rural constituencies. But Mr Fukuda has ruled out spending more on public works and has reaffirmed the goal – reachable – of attaining primary fiscal balance, before debt service, by 2011. If anything, he appears keener on discussing an increase in sales tax from its current 5 per cent than either of his predecessors.
On deregulation, it is true, there is unlikely to be much headway while the opposition controls the upper house. If anyone was hoping for a slashing of farm tariffs or a relaxation of restrictions on foreign workers, think again. But very little was happening anyway. There is little threat of dismantling what has already been done. No politician, at least not yet, is suggesting clearing the supermarket shelves of cold relief capsules.
There are legitimate reasons to worry about Japan, not least the failure of wages to rise and consumer demand to stir. But concern that Mr Fukuda will tear up Mr Koizumi's reform manual is not one of them
位东京的日兴花旗(Nikko Citigroup)首席经济学家村岛喜一(Kiichi Murashima)刚刚从伦敦回国。他不是太开心。在与日本政府债券和股票的投资者们进行了几次会晤后，他得出了这样的结论：“人们正在丧失对日本的兴趣。”
缺乏热情在一定程度上源自于这样一个事实：日本不那么令人兴奋的经济增长，仍依赖于外部需求，而目前这种需求的不确定性更强了。但潜藏在这种失望情绪之下的，是一种更深层次的担忧：上月安倍晋三(Shinzo Abe)政府垮台所导致的政治瘫痪，将引发政策“痉挛”。
从表面上看，这种担忧是可以理解的。上月，执政的自民党(Liberal Democratic party)内一些派系领导人将现年71岁、身穿灰色西装的福田康夫(Yasuo Fukuda)推上了台。此次选举带有小泉纯一郎(Junichiro Koizumi)之前那种老式的日本味道。小泉是安倍前一任首相，他通过直接吸引公众支持而打破惯例。
对于担忧者而言，更糟糕的是，作为一个追求一致意见的政治家，福田康夫是在“小泉改革”面临明显对抗性反应之际就职的。今年7月，日本执政党在国会上院选举中受到了日本较贫困地区投票人的惩罚，对他们而言，5年来的经济复苏没什么实质性效果。
2001年4月至2006年9月期间担任日本首相的小泉曾说服选民（以及相当多的外国投资者）相信“没有改革就不可能有经济增长”。由于他执政时期恰好与多年来历时最长的经济复苏相吻合，因此人们断定，一定是改革促成了这种结果。根据这种过分单纯的分析得出的推论是，如果现在停止改革，那么经济增长也将停顿。
对于结构性改革及其在日本经济复苏中起到的作用（如果说它有什么作用的话），存在着一种误解。在最有利的情况下，“改革”是个用于表示“良好变革”的一个糟糕用词，对于不愿意承认自己推动的新法律并非全部有益的政治家而言，它是个方便的托辞。在日本，这个词同时表示着财政巩固和放宽管制，它所表达的意思更不那么清楚。
在小泉执政期间，无论是削减预算还是推动放宽管制，在促进经济增长方面起到了什么作用？几乎毫无作用。当小泉于2001年银行业危机期间就任时，他承诺大幅降低政府借贷规模。幸运的是，他没有这样做。如果这么做的话，可能会使备受通货紧缩困扰的经济陷入更深的衰退。他的确削减了公共工程预算。在任期即将结束时，他还控制了整体开支，并通过隐形税提高了政府收入。
这可能有利于日本的长期经济健康。但几乎没有经济学家认为，这刺激了经济复苏。
放宽管制能够加速经济增长。但日本的大部分管制放宽（例如在金融和零售业）都是在小泉执政前就已经推行了。
时任小泉政府内阁官房长官的福田康夫在被问及政府在放宽管制方面的闪光之处时，他提到了一个变革：允许非药剂师出售感冒药。虽然对于大批工薪阶层的感冒患者而言，此项意义深远的措施提供了便利，但没人能够说这是经济增长的一个主要源头。
小泉任内经济复苏的真正关键，是蓬勃发展的中国对（日本）出口商产生的有利影响，以及在改革银行业方面取得的成功。为了将日元汇率维持在低位，日本方面进行了大规模汇率干预，这进一步促进了出口。即便在日本的混乱争论中，这一政策也从未被归入改革之列。
小泉真正最大的改革是邮政私有化。此项改革直到他卸任后一年才开始进行，而且要到2017年才能完成。然而，外国投资者在2005年底抓住邮政私有化，将其作为抢购日本股票的一个理由，推动股市猛涨近40%。
雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)在最近一份报告中写道：“尽管小泉时代出现了令人兴奋的现象和浮华的繁荣，但结构改革的步伐并未明显加速。”既然小泉没有开创一个勇敢的新世界，担心福田可能废除全部有益工作就无从谈起。
在财政方面，无论好坏这位新首相都似乎要致力于削减赤字。或许存在将资金重新导向压力重重的农村选区的政治压力。但福田已经排除了在公共事业方面花费更多资金的可能，而且重申了一个可能达成的目标——在2011年前，实现还本付息前的初步财政平衡。如果说有什么不同的话，他似乎比自己的两位前任更热衷于探讨上调目前5%的销售税问题。
在放宽管制方面，由于反对党控制着国会上院，不太可能取得太大进展，这是事实。如果任何人曾指望大幅削减农业税，或放宽对外国工人的限制，那需要三思。但无论如何，发生的改变微乎其微。几乎没有可能废弃已经做了的事情。至少迄今为止，还没有哪位政治家建议清除超市里摆放感冒胶囊的货架。
为日本担心是合乎道理的，包括未能实现工资上涨和刺激消费者需求。但担心福田将撕毁小泉的改革手册并不是理由之一。
译者/梁鸥
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