2015年4月25日 星期六

Japan Must Join China’s Bank By YOICHI FUNABASHI

Japan Must Join China’s Bank

加入亞投行符合日本的利益

東京——上週,57個國家成為了亞洲基礎設施投資銀行(Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,簡稱亞投行)的創始成員國。日本和美國對其治理和透明度表達了疑慮,並決定不加入這家由中國牽頭成立的地區性開發銀行。
即使奧巴馬政府贊成美國成為亞投行成員國,國會也不會同意;最近,美國國會甚至阻止了國際貨幣基金組織(International Monetary Fund)增加資金,儘管增資得到了20國集團(G20)的支持。但日本國會面臨著不同的情況。執政的自民黨(Liberal Democratic Party)內部對於亞投行看法不一,其成員仍在辯論其利弊。自民黨規模較小的執政夥伴公明黨(Komeito),以及反對黨民主黨(Democratic Party),則在很大程度上支持加入亞投行。
日本加入亞投行的理由簡單而有力。通過將財政援助分佈在亞太國家,亞投行將不可避免地參與該地區未來經濟架構的塑造,此外也會間接地塑造地區內的安全關係。參與亞投行符合日本的重大戰略利益。
日本長期以來一直走在區域組織的前沿,它幫助建立了亞太經濟合作組織(Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation)這個論壇、東盟地區論壇(Asean Regional Forum)和東亞峰會(East Asia Summit)。它還是亞洲最大的捐助國。2012年,日本的官方開發援助(ODA)淨值,加上雙邊援助,以及捐贈給國際組織的資金,總共超過106億​​美元(約合650億元人民幣),其中有56%以上流向了亞洲國家。相比之下,中國每年提供的對外援助估計有50億美元,只佔亞洲對外援助總和的30%出頭。
上世紀60年代,日本開始認真開展ODA計劃,當時它正處在一段巨大的經濟增長期中,二戰後日本獲得的大量基礎設施投資,部分上促進了那輪增長。到了90年代,日本已經成為世界上最大的ODA捐贈國。其活動範圍也很廣泛——應對環境問題、衛生和救災。日本在這些​​領域的專業知識對於亞投行,以及對需要增加基礎設施投資的戰略夥伴,如印度尼西亞、越南和緬甸,都是很有價值的。如果日本能與中國合作,協助這些國家發展,就會有助於維護亞太地區的整體穩定。
事實上,亞投行必須被視為一個關乎於整個亞太地區,而不僅僅是亞洲的項目。該銀行的決策機制還有待確定,但一個建議是將高達75%的表決權分配給“區域成員”。這類成員不應該像北京似乎設想的那樣,僅僅局限於亞洲國​​家,而把太平洋國家排除在外。泛區域的做法是符合日本利益的,如果它成為亞投行成員,它就能最好地捍衛這一主張。
在首相大平正芳(Masayoshi Ohira)推動泛太平洋合作之後,至少自上世紀80年代初開始,這樣一種全面的眼光就成了日本的官方戰略。歷史顯示,日本偏離這種觀念會帶來危險。在19世紀末,日本成為第一個實現現代化的亞洲國家,很快它變成了全球大國之一。但在身份和戰略上,它都被夾在代表東方的亞洲和當時象征西方的太平洋之間。
由於感覺自己受到西方國家的排斥,在20世紀30年代,日本開始了自己的門羅主義(Monroe Doctrine)路線,引發了第二次中日戰爭,以及對抗盟國的太平洋戰爭。日本如果拒絕加入亞投行,恐怕會再次在亞洲大陸與太平洋國家之間,劃出一條界線。
而且,確保自由主義國際秩序的主要原則在亞太地區得到尊重,這也符合日本的最大利益。日本和美國政府都在擔心,亞投行將被用來造福於腐敗的中國國有企業,推動北京那種威權資本主義的發展模式。他們的擔憂是可以理解的;中國在基礎設施投資的管理上存在污點。但是,這反而讓日本以及美國更有理由加入亞投行了:只有這樣,這兩個國家才有更好的機會從內部塑造該銀行的規則。
中國在東海和南海的自負舉動,確實有理由讓日本感到不安,並以努力增強自身的威懾力來作為回應。然而,像亞投行這種會在重塑該地區經濟結構的過程中發揮重要作用的項目,可以和領土爭端問題相互區分,即使國與國之間關係緊張,也可以一起推進這種項目。
日本的一些戰略專家,包括外交部的分析師,擔心加入亞投行不利於日美關係——而在這兩個盟國之間製造隔閡,正是北京的目的之一。不過,繞開這種陷阱的方法有很多,包括盡快締結跨太平洋夥伴關係(Trans-Pacific Partnership,簡稱TPP)。這個涵蓋12個國家的貿易協定由美國領導,其中不包括中國,它將在亞太地區重申基於規則的自由主義世界秩序。
上週,美國國會及時做出決定,授予奧巴馬“快車道”(fast-track)權限,以締結TPP協議。日本首相安倍晉三(Shinzo Abe)很快將前往美國,他必須把握機會,說服奧巴馬政府敲定這個協議,然後讓日本加入亞投行。日本對中國日益增長的影響力心存警惕,這是可以理解的。但是,要維護自己的利益,最好的辦法就是不要冷落北京的區域性倡議。日本應該在美國的幫助下,參與對這些倡議的塑造,同時也要對建立更具合作性的中日關係抱著希望。
船橋洋一(Yoichi Funabashi)是智庫日本再建基金會(Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation)主席。
翻譯:土土

TOKYO — Last week, 57 nations became founding members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the China-led regional development bank. Japan and the United States opted not to join, expressing doubts over governance and transparency at the new organization.
Even if the Obama administration were in favor of the United States becoming a member, Congress wouldn’t allow it; lately, it has even blocked a funding increase for the International Monetary Fund that was backed by the G-20. But the National Diet of Japan faces a different situation. The governing Liberal Democratic Party is split over the A.I.I.B.; its members are still debating the pros and cons. Komeito, the L.D.P.’s junior coalition party, and the Democratic Party of Japan, the opposition, are largely in favor of membership.
Japan has long been at the forefront of regional organizations, helping to establish the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the Asean Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit. It is a leading donor of aid to Asia. Japan’s net official development assistance (ODA), combining bilateral aid and contributions to international organizations, exceeded $10.6 billion in 2012, with more than 56 percent going to Asian countries. By contrast, China gave out an estimated $5 billion in annual foreign aid, and only just over 30 percent of that in Asia.The case for Japan joining the A.I.I.B. is simple and strong. By distributing financial assistance to states in the Asia-Pacific, the bank will inevitably help shape the region’s future economic architecture, as well as, implicitly, its security relations. Japan has a major strategic interest in participating.
Japan began its ODA program in earnest in the 1960s, during a period of great economic growth prompted partly by the significant infrastructure investment it had received after World War II. By the 1990s, Japan had become the world’s largest ODA donor. Its activities have been wide-ranging — dealing with environmental issues, sanitation and disaster relief. Japan’s expertise in these areas would be valuable to the A.I.I.B., and to key strategic partners that need infrastructure investment to grow, like Indonesia, Vietnam and Myanmar. If Japan can cooperate with China to assist the development of these nations, it would be contributing to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.
Indeed, the A.I.I.B. must be treated as a project that concerns the entire Asia-Pacific region, rather than just Asia. The bank’s decision-making mechanism has yet to be determined, but one proposal is to allocate up to 75 percent of voting shares to “regional members.” That group should not be limited to Asian states to the exclusion of Pacific Ocean nations, as seems to be Beijing’s design. A pan-regional approach is in Japan’s interest, and it can best defend this idea as a member of the A.I.I.B.
Such a comprehensive vision has been Japan’s official strategy at least since the early 1980s, after Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira promoted Pan-Pacific cooperation. History shows that Japan has veered from this notion at its peril. At the end of the 19th century, Japan was the first Asian state to modernize, and it soon became one of the world’s great powers. But in terms of both identity and strategy, it was caught between Asia, representing the East, and the Pacific, then symbolizing the West.
Feeling excluded by Western nations, in the 1930s, Japan embarked on its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, leading to the second Sino-Japanese war and the Pacific war against the Allied Powers. By refusing to join the A.I.I.B., Japan risks once again drawing a line between continental Asia and the Pacific nations.
It is also in Japan’s best interest to ensure that the main tenets of the liberal international order are respected in the Asia-Pacific region. The Japanese and United States governments are concerned that the A.I.I.B. will be used to benefit corrupt Chinese state-owned enterprises and promote Beijing’s authoritarian-capitalist model of development. Their apprehension is understandable; China does have a spotty governance record when it comes to infrastructure investments. But this is only more reason for Japan, as well as the United States, to join the A.I.I.B.: Both countries stand a better chance of shaping the bank’s rules from within.
Japan is justifiably unsettled by China’s assertiveness in the East and South China Seas, and in response is seeking to strengthen its deterrence capabilities. Yet projects such as the A.I.I.B., which will play a key role in redefining the region’s economic architecture, can be kept separate from territorial disputes and be advanced despite such tensions.
Some Japanese strategists, including analysts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are concerned that joining the A.I.I.B. would hurt Japan’s relations with the United States — and that creating a wedge between the two allies is precisely one of Beijing’s objectives. There are ways of avoiding such a trap, however, including by urgently concluding negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the American-led 12-nation trade pact, which excludes China. That agreement will reaffirm the rules-based liberal world order in the Asia-Pacific region.
The U.S. Congress’s decision last week to grant President Obama fast-track authority to conclude the trans-Pacific trade pact is timely. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe must now take advantage of his approaching trip to the United States to convince the Obama administration to finalize the agreement and then to join the A.I.I.B. Japan is understandably wary of China’s growing influence. But the best way to protect its interests is not to snub Beijing’s regional initiatives; it is to help shape them, with the help of the United States, in the hope of creating more cooperative relations with China.
 Yoichi Funabashi is chairman of the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation, a think tank in Tokyo.

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