The document folder that contained the summary of program operations that describes the process for enshrinement of war criminals at Yasukuni Shrine (The Asahi Shimbun)
Documents show state led move to enshrine war criminals at Yasukuni
Documents contradicting the government's claim that it had nothing to do with the 1978 enshrinement of 14 Class-A war criminals have recently emerged from national archives.
The presence of the war criminals has made Yasukuni a controversial site for visits by Japanese prime ministers as Asian nations such as China and South Korea have criticized the role Yasukuni played in Japan during World War II.
Government officials have long insisted that the enshrinement of the 14 Class-A war criminals, including Hideki Tojo, who was prime minister when Japan launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor that brought the United States into the war, was initiated and conducted solely by Yasukuni officials. The same government officials claimed that because the government was not involved and the enshrinement was a religious act conducted on the part of Yasukuni, there was no violation of constitutional provisions separating religion from the state.
However, the documents show that former Health and Welfare Ministry officials had already decided in 1953, one year after Japan regained its independence, on a process by which war criminals would eventually be included among the war dead honored at Yasukuni.
Some passages in the documents call on prefectural governments to ask local shrines for the war dead to enshrine the war criminals first, thereby setting a precedent that would allow Yasukuni officials to also enshrine those individuals.
The role of government officials in the decision harks back to the days before the end of World War II, when the government was in charge of matters relating to enshrinement at Yasukuni.
The documents, retrieved from the National Archives of Japan, include the "Summary for Program Operations" for fiscal 1954, which outlined programs to provide support to war returnees under the jurisdiction of the Health and Welfare Ministry. It was compiled by ministry officials who had previously worked in the Army and Navy ministries.
One document focused on the early resolution of the war criminal issue.
Considerations of what to include in the program summary started soon after the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed in September 1951. The summaries were compiled every year between fiscal 1952 and 1954.
In the 1952 document, a passage calls for efforts to have "the executed" also enshrined at local ceremonies.
After the peace treaty went into effect in April 1952, the 1953 document went even further, saying "enshrinement will be undertaken at the proper opportunity" for the executed war criminals.
A document compiled in December 1953 clearly states that "the ultimate objective is 'enshrinement at Yasukuni Shrine.'" It adds that the move would be made based on public opinion as well as progress made in the provision of condolence money and pensions to the bereaved families of war criminals, the same as was given to all families of the war dead.
Based on the policies laid out in the summaries, the Health and Welfare Ministry in March 1954 issued a directive to prefectural governments to have those not yet enshrined to be included at local "gokoku jinja" that had been established to honor the war dead from that prefecture. That enshrinement was seen as a precondition for eventually enshrining the war criminals at Yasukuni.
The gokoku jinja in Fukuoka, Okayama and Kumamoto prefectures did, in fact, enshrine three Class-A war criminals before their enshrinement at Yasukuni. The three were Koki Hirota, a former prime minister who was the only civilian among those executed, and two former army generals, Kenji Doihara and Akira Muto.
The gokoku jinja in Osaka, Sapporo and Kobe enshrined Class-B and Class-C war criminals before they were enshrined at Yasukuni.
Before enshrinement, government officials ensured that bereaved family members of the war criminals also were given the benefits of bereaved families of the war dead. The similar level of support provided by the government provided the rationale for also moving forward on the enshrinement, which was also provided all war dead.
The expansion of the government support was implemented through legal revisions after 1953, which led to the enshrinement of Class-B and Class-C war criminals at Yasukuni between 1959 and 1966.
A former high-ranking official of the Health and Welfare Ministry said, "If I had known about this document, the responses in the Diet would have been completely different."
Yasukuni Shrine officials refused to comment.
靖，騶，/刓闕/煨燼/靖國
The presence of the war criminals has made Yasukuni a controversial site for visits by Japanese prime ministers as Asian nations such as China and South Korea have criticized the role Yasukuni played in Japan during World War II.
Government officials have long insisted that the enshrinement of the 14 Class-A war criminals, including Hideki Tojo, who was prime minister when Japan launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor that brought the United States into the war, was initiated and conducted solely by Yasukuni officials. The same government officials claimed that because the government was not involved and the enshrinement was a religious act conducted on the part of Yasukuni, there was no violation of constitutional provisions separating religion from the state.
However, the documents show that former Health and Welfare Ministry officials had already decided in 1953, one year after Japan regained its independence, on a process by which war criminals would eventually be included among the war dead honored at Yasukuni.
Some passages in the documents call on prefectural governments to ask local shrines for the war dead to enshrine the war criminals first, thereby setting a precedent that would allow Yasukuni officials to also enshrine those individuals.
The role of government officials in the decision harks back to the days before the end of World War II, when the government was in charge of matters relating to enshrinement at Yasukuni.
The documents, retrieved from the National Archives of Japan, include the "Summary for Program Operations" for fiscal 1954, which outlined programs to provide support to war returnees under the jurisdiction of the Health and Welfare Ministry. It was compiled by ministry officials who had previously worked in the Army and Navy ministries.
One document focused on the early resolution of the war criminal issue.
Considerations of what to include in the program summary started soon after the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed in September 1951. The summaries were compiled every year between fiscal 1952 and 1954.
In the 1952 document, a passage calls for efforts to have "the executed" also enshrined at local ceremonies.
After the peace treaty went into effect in April 1952, the 1953 document went even further, saying "enshrinement will be undertaken at the proper opportunity" for the executed war criminals.
A document compiled in December 1953 clearly states that "the ultimate objective is 'enshrinement at Yasukuni Shrine.'" It adds that the move would be made based on public opinion as well as progress made in the provision of condolence money and pensions to the bereaved families of war criminals, the same as was given to all families of the war dead.
Based on the policies laid out in the summaries, the Health and Welfare Ministry in March 1954 issued a directive to prefectural governments to have those not yet enshrined to be included at local "gokoku jinja" that had been established to honor the war dead from that prefecture. That enshrinement was seen as a precondition for eventually enshrining the war criminals at Yasukuni.
The gokoku jinja in Fukuoka, Okayama and Kumamoto prefectures did, in fact, enshrine three Class-A war criminals before their enshrinement at Yasukuni. The three were Koki Hirota, a former prime minister who was the only civilian among those executed, and two former army generals, Kenji Doihara and Akira Muto.
The gokoku jinja in Osaka, Sapporo and Kobe enshrined Class-B and Class-C war criminals before they were enshrined at Yasukuni.
Before enshrinement, government officials ensured that bereaved family members of the war criminals also were given the benefits of bereaved families of the war dead. The similar level of support provided by the government provided the rationale for also moving forward on the enshrinement, which was also provided all war dead.
The expansion of the government support was implemented through legal revisions after 1953, which led to the enshrinement of Class-B and Class-C war criminals at Yasukuni between 1959 and 1966.
A former high-ranking official of the Health and Welfare Ministry said, "If I had known about this document, the responses in the Diet would have been completely different."
Yasukuni Shrine officials refused to comment.
靖，騶，/刓闕/煨燼/靖國
安倍晉三參拜靖國神社
報道 2012年10月18日
東京——周三，一名可能成為日本下任首相的鷹派反對黨領導人採取了一個具有政治煽動性的行動，在東京參拜了一座紀念戰爭的神社。外界由此擔憂，一旦當上國家領導人，他會不會推行右翼議程，進一步損害已因島嶼爭端受損的日本與亞洲鄰國之間的關係。
反對黨領導人安倍晉三(Shinzo Abe)是直言不諱的民族主義者，曾擔任首相一職，目前是保守黨派自民黨(Liberal Democratic Party)的總裁。他參拜的是供奉包括甲級戰犯在內的日本陣亡人員的靖國神社(Yasukuni Shrine)。這樣的參拜過去曾多次激怒中國和韓國，兩國都是20世紀早期日本軍國主義的受害國，都認為東京市中心的這座大型神社是日本拒絕贖罪的象 徵。
安倍的參拜之所以受到關注，是因為這是他上月贏得黨內選舉之後首次參拜靖國神社。選舉過程中，他在五名保守派候選人中採取了最強硬的路線，呼籲放寬日本和平憲法的限制、允許進行全面的軍事建設，同時還支持進行愛國教育、向學生教授對日本在二戰中的行為更為正面的評價。
安倍還曾宣稱，他希望以首相的身份參拜靖國神社。過去六年中，沒有哪個日本首相採取過這樣的挑釁行為，安倍本人首次擔任首相期間也沒有這麼做過。他 曾於2006年就任首相，一年後便宣布辭職，原因是當時的選民更擔心疲軟的經濟以及國家養老金系統的償付能力，而安倍的右翼議程與選民脫節，公眾支持率因 此暴跌。
現在，安倍有可能再次獲得機會。民意調查顯示，他所在的政黨在全國選舉中領先。選舉最早會在12月進行，這使得安倍成為最可能取代不受歡迎的現任首相野田佳彥(Yoshihiko Noda)的人選。這種前景已經引發了安倍可能再次將日本拉向右翼的擔憂。
不太清楚的是，日本民眾會不會再次追隨安倍。有鑒於中國的日益強大，以及日本在亞洲衰落的經濟和政治影響力，許多日本人都感到越來越不安全。與此同 時，大多數分析人士一致認為，大部分選民仍然反對在外交問題上掀起波瀾，也不願進一步損害與最大貿易夥伴中國的經濟關係。福山大學(Fukuyama University)政治學專家田中秀征(Shusei Tanaka)說，“在黨內，他不得不採取強硬立場。現在的問題是，他是否已經懂得，以前那種強硬立場會把公眾嚇跑。”
美國簽有捍衛日本的協議，因此也越來越擔心，當上首相的安倍是否會對其他亞洲國家採取更具對抗性的立場。
哥倫比亞大學(Columbia University)的日本政治專家傑拉爾德·L·柯蒂斯(Gerald L. Curtis)說，“如果他把他一貫的主張落到實處，我們可能會面臨嚴重的問題。哪裡會有人願意為了尖閣諸島打仗呢？”
不過，柯蒂斯和其他一些政治分析人士稱，眼下還不清楚安倍當上首相之後會不會切實執行這樣的強硬路線。他們說，他們對此抱有審慎的樂觀態度，希望安倍從五年前的失敗當中吸取了教訓：不要與公眾太過脫節。按他們的說法，那是安倍最大的一個教訓。
他的記錄顯示出複雜的結果：擔任首相期間，他否認日本軍方在二戰期間直接參与了強迫婦女充當性奴的行為，這些婦女有許多來自朝鮮半島。這不僅激怒了 韓國，還激怒了美國眾議院(House of Representatives)，眾議院曾在2007年的一項決議中作出回應，要求日本政府向這些在日本被委婉稱為“慰安婦”的婦女道歉。
安倍似乎打算重提這一問題。他誓言修改所謂的“河野談話”(Kono Statement)，這是日本政府於1993年為二戰中日軍強迫婦女充當性奴隸的行為所作的官方道歉。這一舉動幾乎肯定會招致韓國的強烈反對，因為該國對日本20世紀早期的軍國主義行為記憶猶新。
安倍還在尖閣諸島/釣魚島問題上採取了一種具有潛在爆炸性的姿態，聲稱會考慮向這些目前無人居住的島嶼派駐海上保安廳(Coast Guard)人員，以便加強安全。中國已經表示，將對任何改變現狀的行為作出強有力的回應。上個月，中國政府作出了憤怒的回應，因為日本政府決定購買五個 島嶼之中的三個。
日本對中國的擔憂日益增長，已經使得日本公眾更加願意在島嶼爭端之中以比以前更為有力的姿態來直面中國，例如在島嶼周圍部署數十艘海上保安廳快艇。分析人士表示，如果中國繼續加強對日本的壓力，安倍的民族主義觀點可能會找到更為肥沃的土壤。
然而，就目前而言，似乎只有少數選民被安倍的右翼言論所吸引。大多數選民似乎更擔心其他問題，例如，如果風頭不順，安倍是否會重拾2007年的做法，上任一年便一走了之。
分析人士稱，這種懷疑反映在安倍的低支持率中。最近的民調顯示他的支持率在35%上下，僅稍稍領先野田。
反對黨領導人安倍晉三(Shinzo Abe)是直言不諱的民族主義者，曾擔任首相一職，目前是保守黨派自民黨(Liberal Democratic Party)的總裁。他參拜的是供奉包括甲級戰犯在內的日本陣亡人員的靖國神社(Yasukuni Shrine)。這樣的參拜過去曾多次激怒中國和韓國，兩國都是20世紀早期日本軍國主義的受害國，都認為東京市中心的這座大型神社是日本拒絕贖罪的象 徵。
安倍還曾宣稱，他希望以首相的身份參拜靖國神社。過去六年中，沒有哪個日本首相採取過這樣的挑釁行為，安倍本人首次擔任首相期間也沒有這麼做過。他 曾於2006年就任首相，一年後便宣布辭職，原因是當時的選民更擔心疲軟的經濟以及國家養老金系統的償付能力，而安倍的右翼議程與選民脫節，公眾支持率因 此暴跌。
現在，安倍有可能再次獲得機會。民意調查顯示，他所在的政黨在全國選舉中領先。選舉最早會在12月進行，這使得安倍成為最可能取代不受歡迎的現任首相野田佳彥(Yoshihiko Noda)的人選。這種前景已經引發了安倍可能再次將日本拉向右翼的擔憂。
不太清楚的是，日本民眾會不會再次追隨安倍。有鑒於中國的日益強大，以及日本在亞洲衰落的經濟和政治影響力，許多日本人都感到越來越不安全。與此同 時，大多數分析人士一致認為，大部分選民仍然反對在外交問題上掀起波瀾，也不願進一步損害與最大貿易夥伴中國的經濟關係。福山大學(Fukuyama University)政治學專家田中秀征(Shusei Tanaka)說，“在黨內，他不得不採取強硬立場。現在的問題是，他是否已經懂得，以前那種強硬立場會把公眾嚇跑。”
美國簽有捍衛日本的協議，因此也越來越擔心，當上首相的安倍是否會對其他亞洲國家採取更具對抗性的立場。
哥倫比亞大學(Columbia University)的日本政治專家傑拉爾德·L·柯蒂斯(Gerald L. Curtis)說，“如果他把他一貫的主張落到實處，我們可能會面臨嚴重的問題。哪裡會有人願意為了尖閣諸島打仗呢？”
不過，柯蒂斯和其他一些政治分析人士稱，眼下還不清楚安倍當上首相之後會不會切實執行這樣的強硬路線。他們說，他們對此抱有審慎的樂觀態度，希望安倍從五年前的失敗當中吸取了教訓：不要與公眾太過脫節。按他們的說法，那是安倍最大的一個教訓。
他的記錄顯示出複雜的結果：擔任首相期間，他否認日本軍方在二戰期間直接參与了強迫婦女充當性奴的行為，這些婦女有許多來自朝鮮半島。這不僅激怒了 韓國，還激怒了美國眾議院(House of Representatives)，眾議院曾在2007年的一項決議中作出回應，要求日本政府向這些在日本被委婉稱為“慰安婦”的婦女道歉。
安倍似乎打算重提這一問題。他誓言修改所謂的“河野談話”(Kono Statement)，這是日本政府於1993年為二戰中日軍強迫婦女充當性奴隸的行為所作的官方道歉。這一舉動幾乎肯定會招致韓國的強烈反對，因為該國對日本20世紀早期的軍國主義行為記憶猶新。
安倍還在尖閣諸島/釣魚島問題上採取了一種具有潛在爆炸性的姿態，聲稱會考慮向這些目前無人居住的島嶼派駐海上保安廳(Coast Guard)人員，以便加強安全。中國已經表示，將對任何改變現狀的行為作出強有力的回應。上個月，中國政府作出了憤怒的回應，因為日本政府決定購買五個 島嶼之中的三個。
日本對中國的擔憂日益增長，已經使得日本公眾更加願意在島嶼爭端之中以比以前更為有力的姿態來直面中國，例如在島嶼周圍部署數十艘海上保安廳快艇。分析人士表示，如果中國繼續加強對日本的壓力，安倍的民族主義觀點可能會找到更為肥沃的土壤。
然而，就目前而言，似乎只有少數選民被安倍的右翼言論所吸引。大多數選民似乎更擔心其他問題，例如，如果風頭不順，安倍是否會重拾2007年的做法，上任一年便一走了之。
分析人士稱，這種懷疑反映在安倍的低支持率中。最近的民調顯示他的支持率在35%上下，僅稍稍領先野田。
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