Toyota and Suzuki have announced plans to expand their partnership. The firms will enter into an equity tie-up to accelerate their work in self-driving technology and other fields.
2019年8月31日 星期六
2019年8月23日 星期五
2019年8月22日 星期四
日本：稀土元素；擴在國內栽培用作中藥（日本稱漢方藥）原料
現在應該報告 日本在深海發現的稀土元素之開採行行。
分析：美国看上格陵兰岛稀土 02:26 AM
2014.4.9 日本擴在國內栽培用作中藥（日本稱漢方藥）原料 (比較其他如稀土元素......)
日本中草藥要擺脫對華依賴2014/04/09
日本在國內栽培用作中藥（日本稱漢方藥）原料的生藥的趨勢正在擴大。以龍角散公司為核心的日本生藥生產團體將在本月內與新潟縣的兩地展開合作，利用植物工廠啟動人工栽培。日本國內的生藥栽培正在增加（北海道夕張市）津村公司將把其在北海道的栽培面積最多擴大至3倍以上，達到1000公頃。目前日本醫生開出的中藥處方正在增加，但日本生藥的80%仍依賴從中國進口。各公司希望通過在日本栽培生藥確保貨源穩定。東京生藥協會將在本月內與新潟縣新潟市和新發田市展開合作。將在新潟市新建植物工廠栽培高麗人參。將利用發光二極管（LED）等人工照明，把栽培時間縮短一半，縮短到2年半。建立能穩定生產的工廠栽培技術，將有助於抑制價格的劇烈波動。津村計劃在2020年之前將栽培生藥的耕地面積擴大到3倍，將委託JA道央等生藥生產者團體栽培能改善鼻塞的川芎和具有解熱功能的蘇葉等，並將全量採購。中藥主要由利用植物根和葉加工而成的生藥搭配在一起製成。目前日本西醫為中心進行學習的醫生選擇中藥的情況也在增加。在中藥市場中，醫生開出處方的藥品在2012年度達到1312億日元，比5年前增加了30%。因此，其他行業的企業也在積極進入生藥栽培領域。王子控股公司與北海道下川町簽署了合作協定。而鹿島則攜手千葉大學共同開發出了對有鎮痛功效的甘草進行水耕栽培的技術。不過，日本用於藥物的生藥80%仍依賴從中國進口。由於易受天氣異常等的影響，有預測稱2013年產生藥的採購價格將達到2006年產的兩倍。
在世界上翱翔的HondaJet : 本田宗一郎的飛機夢想成真
2018年，本田旗下的飛航事業公司Honda Aircraft Company（總公司位於美國北卡羅萊納州格林斯堡市）推出的HondaJet，在小型噴射機的領域裡創下紀錄，銷售數量37架，居世界首位。這是繼2017年銷售出43架之後，連續兩年蟬聯冠軍。
一直以來，小型商用噴射機的市場是以美國賽斯納（Cessna）公司為首的少數飛航公司獨占鰲頭。在這種情況下，沒有造飛機經驗的日本兩輪及汽車製造商加入戰局，竟然還空降銷售榜冠軍，創下紀錄。
https://www.nippon.com/hk/in-depth/d00469/
一直以來，小型商用噴射機的市場是以美國賽斯納（Cessna）公司為首的少數飛航公司獨占鰲頭。在這種情況下，沒有造飛機經驗的日本兩輪及汽車製造商加入戰局，竟然還空降銷售榜冠軍，創下紀錄。
https://www.nippon.com/hk/in-depth/d00469/
2019年8月21日 星期三
In Japan, the abacus is still popular
|
|
|
|
擁有350年歷史的龜甲萬 The Kikkoman Chronicles: A Global Company With a Japanese Soul 此書有漢譯
The Kikkoman Chronicles: A Global Company With a Japanese Soul ハードカバー – 1998/10/31
2019年8月17日 星期六
日本的「咖啡文化」——內涵不斷深化，形式愈發多樣
日本的「咖啡文化」從大受歡迎的便利商店100日圓咖啡，到美國「藍瓶咖啡（Blue Bottle Coffee）」的開張，日本的咖啡市場呈現出一派活躍景象🥰☕️👍
而那些地方城市裏長久以來支撐並推動著日本獨特咖啡文化發展的咖啡館，也依舊富有個性，充滿活力。當你漫步街頭，看到中意的咖啡館時，進去坐坐如何？或許它能給你帶來一些特別的感受。
🔍全文內容點選下方連結⋯⋯更多
NIPPON.COM
日本的「咖啡文化」——內涵不斷深化，形式愈發多樣
日本計程車的乘客，數量不及泡沫經濟時期的一半
2017年1月30日起，東京的23個市區以及武藏野市和三鷹市，大幅調整計程車的收費體系，起步價從原來的「2公里內730日圓」調整為「1.052公里內410日圓」。此舉的目標是促使人們「短距離乘車」，諸如「稍微去趟百貨公司」、「既然都到這裡了，也順便去一下那邊」之類的需求。另外，由於外國遊客人數日益增加，一些公司也在加強外籍計程車司機的錄用工作。
日本計程車的乘客，數量不及泡沫經濟時期的一半｜https://www.nippon.com/hk/japan-data/h00315/
日本計程車的乘客，數量不及泡沫經濟時期的一半｜https://www.nippon.com/hk/japan-data/h00315/
從「少子老齡化」到「無子老齡化」：日本社會難以擺脫依賴家庭主婦的魔咒
日本社會的少子化問題進展迅速的原因在於，人口數量龐大的「團塊2代」（1971～1974年第二次嬰兒潮時期出生的人）及「後團塊2代」（在被稱為「團塊2代」的一代人後，即1975～1979年出生的人）的未婚率上升。企業為了生存下去，裁減正式員工人數，導致年輕人的非正式雇傭愈演愈烈。年輕人的工作不穩定，收入又很低，他們怎麼能安心養育子女呢？最近由於人手短缺，年輕人的就業形勢良好，人們徹底忘記了日本「失去的20年」同時也是以犧牲年輕人為代價，進一步推進少子化的時代。應儘早為年輕人創造良好的環境，讓他們得到穩定的工作，讓那些希望養育子女的人能夠安心結婚和生產。
https://www.nippon.com/hk/in-depth/d00452/
https://www.nippon.com/hk/in-depth/d00452/
Real cost of scrapping reactors
Real cost of scrapping reactors
Tepco's recent decision to decommission its Fukushima No. 2 nuclear power plant ..
While the total expense of decommissioning the Fukushima No. 1 plant is expected to reach ¥8 trillion, scrapping the No. 2 plant is projected to cost ¥400 billion, although that amount does not include the cost of building a storage facility there to store more than 10,000 spent fuel assemblies....雖然福島第一工廠退役的總費用預計將達到8萬億日元，但廢棄第二工廠預計將耗資4,000億日元，儘管該數額不包括在那裡建造存儲設施的成本 超過10,000個乏燃料組件。(Google翻譯)....
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/08/17/editorials/real-cost-scrapping-reactors/#.XVgjwOgza00
EDITORIALS
Real cost of scrapping reactors
Tepco’s recent decision to decommission its Fukushima No. 2 nuclear power plant highlights one of the big challenges for both the power industry and the government — which has pushed for nuclear power as a matter of state policy — in the wake of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster. Combined with the Fukushima No. 1 plant where three reactors suffered catastrophic meltdowns more than eight years ago, Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings Inc. now faces an unprecedented job of scrapping 10 reactors at around the same time, an effort that is estimated to take more than 40 years.
Decommissioning a nuclear plant takes so long it extends across generations, and the operator needs to train and secure people with the needed skills and technology to sustain the work through to completion. The decommissioning of Fukushima No. 1 entails the extra tasks of removing the melted fuel debris from reactor containment vessels as well as disposing of enormous amounts of contaminated water.
How and where to finally dispose of the large volume of radioactive waste from the decommissioned plants is a question for which the nation still does not have a clear answer. Steadily and safely scrapping reactors in large numbers is a challenge that must be taken on not just by the power companies that ran them, but the government as well.
Tepco’s Fukushima No. 2 facility, about 12 km from the No. 1 plant, has four reactors. Each is capable of generating 1.1 million kilowatts of electricity for the Tokyo metropolitan area. Unlike the No. 1 plant, Fukushima No. 2 survived the onslaught of tsunami in the March 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake. Three of its four reactors temporarily lost their core cooling functions when the plant was flooded by the tsunami, but eventually they were safely shut down.
That did not stop the Fukushima Prefectural Government and the No. 2 plant’s host municipalities of Naraha and Tomioka from calling for its decommissioning since immediately after the 2011 disaster, arguing that its continuing operation would hinder reconstruction efforts in areas affected by the nuclear crisis.
But it was only in June last year that Tepco indicated its intention to decommission the No. 2 plant — and the final decision was made last month. Tepco reportedly explored the possibility of restarting the No. 2 plant, which has remained offline since 2011, as a way to save on imported fuel costs to run thermal power plants and rebuild the company’s finances. It’s questionable whether it was wise to hold off on the decision for so long: Given the huge impact the nuclear disaster has had on local people, there was little chance that the prefecture or the host towns would give their consent to restarting the No. 2 plant.
To date, 24 commercial reactors have been earmarked for decommissioning, including the four at Fukushima No. 2. Before the nuclear crisis, 54 reactors were operating nationwide. Three reactors had been selected for demolition before 3/11, meaning that 21 — roughly 40 percent of the total — were chosen to face the wrecking ball after the disaster. Aside from the 10 reactors at Tepco’s Fukushima No. 1 and No. 2 plants, the decisions by the plant operators were influenced mainly by economic calculations.
Rules introduced after the Fukushima disaster limited the lifetime of reactors to 40 years after construction — but that can be extended by up to 20 years. Safety regulations introduced by the Nuclear Regulation Authority post-3/11 require power companies to make massive investments to ramp up measures against accidents and natural disasters such as major earthquakes and tsunami before they can reactivate reactors idled in the wake of the 2011 accident.
Seeking the NRA’s approval to extend a reactor’s operation beyond the 40-year limit also requires the owner to make additional safety investments. The power companies have decided to decommission many of their aging reactors that had relatively small output capacity when they determined they couldn’t recoup the cost of such investments even if they extended the reactor’s operation.
While the total expense of decommissioning the Fukushima No. 1 plant is expected to reach ¥8 trillion, scrapping the No. 2 plant is projected to cost ¥400 billion, although that amount does not include the cost of building a storage facility there to store more than 10,000 spent fuel assemblies.
While Tepco has promised to take all of the No. 2 plant’s spent fuel out of Fukushima Prefecture before the plant’s decommissioning is completed — which it expects to take more than 40 years — it is not clear where the company eventually plans to ship the fuel assemblies.
Decommissioning is an integral part of a nuclear plant’s life cycle. Uncertainties linger over some elements of the work involved, such as the disposal of highly radioactive waste. It remains to be tested whether Tepco, still under reconstruction from the impact of the 2011 disaster, has the manpower and resources to take on the hard task of scrapping 10 reactors more or less simultaneously.
The government needs to explore what steps it can take to ensure that the decommissioning of large numbers of nuclear reactors will proceed steadily and safely.
訂閱：
文章 (Atom)